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Practical Concerns Regarding the Arbitration of
Statutory Employment Claims:
Questions That Remain Unanswered After Gilmer and
Some Suggested Answers
For every complex problem, there is a solution that is short, simple, and
probably wrong - H.L. Menckeni
I. INTRODUCTION
The legality of arbitrating statutory claims arising out of employment
has become quite controversial. In 1991, the United States Supreme Court
delivered a decision which has the potential to evict employment claims
from the judicial forum altogether. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,2 the Court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)3 compelled
arbitration of a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA)4 where the claimant had signed an agreement in a securities
registration application5 to arbitrate all employment disputes. 6 This decision
appears to permit, and perhaps even encourage, employers to establish
arbitration systems as a means to resolve statutory obligations outside of the
judicial forum. In so doing, the Court takes arbitration out of its traditional
context of labor-management relations in the union setting.
Assuming that Gilmer provides a valid legal basis for the enforceability
of an arbitration provision as a condition of employment, many practical
issues and concerns remain unanswered regarding how arbitration should
function in a non-union setting. Such unanswered questions are the focus of
this Article. Section II discusses the Gilmer decision in detail, its impact,
and the concerns that have arisen because of it. Section III describes our
present system of arbitration in terms of how it functions, its traditional use
in the labor-management context, and its advantages and disadvantages in
1 See Arnold Zack, President of the National Academy of Arbitrators, Testimony at the
final public hearing before the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management Relations
(Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor) [hereinafter Dunlop
Commission]. This quote was used in the introductory portion of the testimony given by Mr.
Zack.
2 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3 9 U.S.C. § 1-307 (Supp. 1992).
4 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
5 The application was entitled "Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration
or Transfer." 500 U.S. at 23.
6 Id. at 35. "Gilmer has not met his burden of showing that Congress, in enacting the
ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that Act." Id.
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such a setting. Finally, Section IV raises and addresses the specific issues
and concerns regarding the arbitration of statutory employment claims in the
non-union setting, and attempts to offer some suggestions and conclusions
as to how arbitration would be most effective in such an arena.
II. GILMER V. INTERSTATE/JOHNSON LANE CORPORATION 7
A. Synopsis of Decision
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation (Interstate) hired Robert Gilmer in
1981 as a Manager of Financial Services. 8 As required for his employment,
Gilmer registered as a securities representative with the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE). 9  Gilmer's registration application contained an
arbitration clause pursuant to which he agreed to arbitrate any disputes
between him and his employer arising out of his employment or the
termination of his employment. 10
Interstate terminated Gilmer's employment in 1987 when he was sixty-
two years of age. 11 Believing that he had been discharged because of his
age, Gilmer filed a charge of age discrimination with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). 12 When Gilmer subse-
quently sued in federal court, 13 Interstate filed a motion to compel
arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. 14 In doing so, Interstate relied
upon the arbitration agreement contained in Gilmer's securities registration
application with the NYSE, whereby Gilmer had agreed to "arbitrate any
dispute, claim, or controversy" arising between him and Interstate that "is
7 Gilmer, 500 U.S. 20.
8 Id. at 23.
9Id.
10 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 (4th Cir. 1990). The
arbitration clause in Gilmer's securities application provided: "I agree to arbitrate any dispute,
claim, or controversy that may arise between me and my firm . . . that is required to be
arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws, of the organizations with which I
register ... ." Id. at 196 n.1.
11 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
12 id.
13 id.
14 9 U.S.C. § 4. "A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another
to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a civil action
or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the controversy between the
parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such
agreement." Id.
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required to be arbitrated under the rules, constitutions, or by-laws, of the
organizations with which [he] register[ed]." 15 Among the disputes which
the NYSE rules require to be arbitrated are those "arising out of the
employment or termination of employment of such registered
representative." 16 The NYSE rules made the duty to arbitrate mutual,
obligating both the employer and the employee. 17  Specifically, the
employer was bound as a member of the NYSE, and the employee was
bound by the registration application.1
8
The district court, relying upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 19 and its own conclusion that "Congress
intended to protect ADEA claimants from the waiver of a judicial forum," 20
denied Interstate's motion to compel arbitration. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, 2 ' basing its holding on
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon,22 in which the Supreme
Court had held that the FAA establishes a presumption of enforceability of
arbitration agreements, and on its own finding that "nothing in the text,
legislative history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA indicat[es] a
congressional intent to preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements."23
Subsequently, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve
the question of whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 can be subjected to compulsory arbitration
pursuant to an arbitration agreement in a securities registration
application. 24
15 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23 (quoting in part Gilmer's NYSE registration application).
16 1d. at23.
17 As set out in the Uniform Application for Securities Industry Registration or Transfer,
supra note 5, at 23.
18 Uniform Application for Securities Industry Regulation or Transfer, supra note 5, at
23.
19 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See infra text accompanying note 47.
20 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
21 Id.
22 482 U.S. 220 (1987). The presumption can only be rebutted if Congress intended that
the rights granted in a statute should not be resolved by arbitration. The intent of Congress
can be manifested in one of three ways: textual prohibition of arbitration in the statute,
legislative history indicating an intent to preclude arbitration, or an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the statute's underlying purpose. Id. at 226-27.
23 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir. 1990).
24 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23. A major reason for granting certiorari was to resolve the split
in circuits regarding this issue. Cf. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221 (3rd Cir.
1989).
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Relying on McMahon,25 the Court stated that the presumption that the
arbitration agreement was enforceable could only be rebutted if Congress
intended that the statutory rights established in the ADEA should not be
resolved by arbitration. 26 Gilmer conceded that nothing in the text of the
ADEA or in the ADEA's legislative history precludes arbitration,27 but
argued that compulsory arbitration of age discrimination claims would
conflict with the underlying framework and purposes of the statutory
scheme of the ADEA. 28
The Court, however, rejected this argument. Although it agreed with
Gilmer's assertion that the ADEA is designed not only to address individual
grievances but also to further important social policies, 29 the Court found
no inconsistency between those social policies and enforcing agreements to
arbitrate age discrimination claims. 30 The Court pointed out that the
Sherman Act,3 1 the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,32 RICO, 33 and the
Securities Act of 193334 are all designed to advance important social
policies, and that all of those statutes have been deemed appropriate for
arbitration.35 The Court also rejected Gilmer's claim that compulsory
arbitration would undermine the EEOC's active role in enforcing the
ADEA.3 6
25 482 U.S. 220.
26 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 27.
29 Id.
3 0 id.
31 15 U.S.C.S §§ 1-7 (1990).
32 15 U.S.C.S § 78j(b) (1990).
33 18 U.S.C.S § 1961 et seq. (1990)
34 15 U.S.C.S § 771 (1990).
35 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
36 Id. at 28-29. The Court asserted that an ADEA claimant subject to compulsory
arbitration may still file a charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to
institute a private judicial action. Moreover, the Court stated that the EEOC's role in
combatting age discrimination is not dependent on the filing of a charge, as the EEOC has the
authority to make independent investigations. Finally, the Court pointed out that nothing in
the ADEA indicated that Congress intended for the EEOC be involved in all employment
disputes. Thus, the Court concluded, the mere involvement of an administrative agency in the
enforcement of a statute is insufficient to preclude arbitration. Gilmer also argued that
compulsory arbitration would be improper because it would deprive plaintiffs of the judicial
forum provided for by the ADEA. The Court asserted that such a contention could not stand
in light of the fact that Congress did not manifest an intent either in the text or in the
legislative history of the ADEA to protect claimants against waiver of the right to a judicial
forum. Moreover, the Court noted the ADEA's flexible approach to the resolution of age
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Gilmer's challenges to the adequacy of arbitration procedures in
enforcing substantive rights were rejected by the Court as well. 37 The Court
declined to indulge Gilmer's first speculation that the parties and the arbitral
body would not retain competent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.38
However, the Court did note that both the NYSE rules and the FAA protect
against biased panels. 39 Gilmer next complained that the discovery allowed
in arbitration is more limited than in the federal courts, which he contended
would make proving discrimination more difficult. 40 The Court saw no
merit in this argument, noting that it was unlikely that age discrimination
claims would require more extensive discovery than the RICO and antitrust
claims already deemed arbitrable under prior holdings.41 The Court asserted
that there had been no showing that the NYSE discovery provisions, which
allow for document production, information requests, and subpoenas, would
prove insufficient to allow Gilmer a fair opportunity to prove his claim.42
Moreover, Gilmer alleged that, because arbitrators often do not issue
written opinions, any resolution in the arbitral forum would result in a lack
of public knowledge of employers' discriminatory policies, an inability to
obtain effective appellate review, and a stifling of the development of the
law.43 The Court rejected this contention by noting that the NYSE rules
require that arbitration awards be in writing and be made available to the
public.44 Furthermore, the Court stated that because many ADEA claimants
will not be subject to arbitration agreements, judicial decisions addressing
ADEA claims would continue to be issued.45
Gilmer argued that arbitration procedures could not adequately further
the purposes of the ADEA because they do not provide for broad equitable
relief and class actions.46 The Court responded to this by noting that
arbitrators do have the power to fashion equitable relief, and that the NYSE
rules provide for collective proceedings and are not restrictive in the types
of relief that an arbitrator may award. Moreover, the Court noted that
discrimination claims, through methods of out-of-court dispute resolution such as arbitration,
is consistent with the statutory scheme established by Congress. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 28.
3 7 Id. at 30-32.
381 id. at 30.
3 9 Id. at 30-31.
40Id. at31.
41 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
4 2 
rd.
43 id.
44 Id. at 31-32.
4 5 1d. at32.
46 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
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arbitration agreements do not preclude the EEOC from bringing actions
seeking class-wide and equitable relief.47
The next reason Gilmer advanced for refusing to enforce arbitration
agreements relating to ADEA claims was his contention that there is often
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees. 48 The Court
determined, however, that mere inequality of bargaining power was not a
sufficient reason to hold that arbitration agreements are unenforceable in the
employment context. 49 The Court believed that such a claim is best left for
resolution in specific cases, and noted that in this particular case there was
no indication that Gilmer, an experienced businessman, was coerced or
defrauded into agreeing to the arbitration clause in his registration
application. 50
Gilmer's final argument resisted arbitration on the basis of the Court's
decision in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.5 1 and its progeny, 52 in which
47 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32.
48 Id. at 32-33.
4 9 Id. at 33.
50 Id. at 33.
5' 415 U.S. 36 (1974). In Gardner-Denver, the issue was whether a discharged
employee whose grievance had been arbitrated pursuant to an arbitration clause in a collective
bargaining agreement was precluded from subsequently bringing a Title VII action based upon
the conduct that was the subject of the grievance. In holding that the employee was not
foreclosed from bringing the Title VII claim, the Supreme Court stressed that an employee's
contractual rights under a collective bargaining agreement are distinct from the employee's
statutory Title VII rights:
In submitting his grievance to arbitration, an employee seeks to vindicate his
contractual right under a collective bargaining agreement. By contrast, in filing a
lawsuit under Title VII, an employee asserts independent statutory rights accorded
by Congress. The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and statutory rights
is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a result of the same factual
occurrence.
Gilner, 500 U.S. at 24 (quoting 415 U.S. at 49-50).
The Court also noted that a labor arbitrator has authority only to resolve questions of
contractual rights. The arbitrator's "task is to effectuate the intent of the parties" and he or she
does not have the "general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain
between the parties." Id. at 34 (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 53). By contrast, "in
instituting an action under Title VII, the employee is not seeking review of the arbitrator's
decision. Rather, he is asserting a statutory right independent of the arbitration process." Id.
(quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 54). The Court further expressed concern that in collective
bargaining arbitration "the interests of the individual employee may be subordinated to the
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the Court held that the arbitration of an employment dispute under a
collective bargaining agreement did not preclude subsequent resort to a
judicial forum in order to enforce statutory employment rights. Gilmer
argued that statutory discrimination claims could not be adequately resolved
in arbitration because the rights invoked by such statutes deserve the
publicity of a judicial forum. 53 Reliance on this line of cases was justified
because the Gardner-Denver line of cases highlights the inferiority of
arbitration to litigation in the protection of statutory rights and emphasizes
the superiority of judges over arbitrators. 54
Interstate, on the other hand, insisted on arbitration on the basis of a
line of FAA cases decided after Gardner-Denver. These cases held that the
Federal Arbitration Act demands enforcement of private agreements to
arbitrate statutory claims arising under antitrust, 55 securities, 56 and
racketeering57 laws. These cases are often referred to as the Mitsubishi
trilogy, named after the first case to hold statutory claims arbitrable. 58
In the employment cases under the Gardner-Denver line, no mention
was made of the Federal Arbitration Act. The FAA cases decided after
Gardner-Denver did not involve statutory employment rights. The interplay
between the FAA cases and the employment cases had to be addressed and
resolved, because the Mitsubishi trilogy allowed the arbitration of statutory
claims, while the Gardner-Denver trilogy did not.
The Gilmer Court ruled against Gilmer on this argument as well,
stating that Gilmer's reliance on Gardner-Denver and its progeny was
collective interests of all employees in the bargaining unit." Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24 (quoting
Alexander, 415 U.S. at 59 n.19).
52 Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald
v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984). These two cases similarly involved the issue of
whether arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement precluded a subsequent statutory
claim. In holding that the statutory claims there were not precluded, the Supreme Court noted,
as they did in Gardner-Denver, the difference between contractual rights under a collective
bargaining agreement and individual statutory rights, the potential disparity in interests
between a union and an employee, and the limited authority and power of labor arbitrators.
Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 35.
53 Id. at 32.
M See generally Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Barrentine v.
Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. City of West Branch,
466 U.S. 284 (1984).
55 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
56 Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989);
Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
57 Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
58 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
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misplaced. Those cases, the Court said, involved the issue of whether the
arbitration of contract-based claims precluded subsequent judicial resolution
of statutory claims, not the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate
statutory claims. 59 The arbitration in those cases occurred in the context of
the collective bargaining agreement, and thus there was concern about the
tension between collective representation and individual statutory rights that
is not applicable in the case at hand. 60 In addition, the Gardner-Denver
cases were not decided under the FAA, which reflects a "liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements."61 Therefore, the Court concluded
that the line of cases Gilmer relied upon provided no basis for refusing to
enforce his agreement to arbitrate his ADEA claim.62
In summary, the Court, in a 7-2 decision, ruled against Gilmer and
concluded that he had "not met his burden of showing that Congress, in
enacting the ADEA, intended to preclude arbitration of claims under that
Act."63 In so doing, it held that the FAA applies to agreements to arbitrate
employment claims of age discrimination. 64 The Court observed that by
signing an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim, the claimant is not
foregoing a substantive right, but instead is submitting the right to an
arbitral forum, rather than a judicial one.65 The Court also noted that "[W]e
are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of
arbitration and the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the
development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution."66
Thus, even though the Court understood that Gilmer's agreement to
arbitrate was a condition of employment, one exacted for all securities
dealers in the industry, it found that there was no reason to deny
enforcement of such an agreement absent coercion or fraud.
59 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33-34.
60 Id. at 34-35.
61 Id. at 35 (quoting Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S. at 625).
62 id.
63 Id. at 35.
64 Gilrer, 500 U.S. at 33-35.
65 Id. at 26.
66 Id. at 34 n.5 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473
U.S.at 626).
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B. The Impact of the Gilmer decision
It is not entirely clear whether the Gilmer decision, decided pursuant to
the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 applies to all employment disputes.
According to section 1 of the FAA, "[N]othing herein contained shall apply
to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad employees or any other
class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 68 Because
Gilmer's agreement to arbitrate was pursuant to a securities registration
agreement with the NYSE, rather than pursuant to the terms of the actual
employment contract, the Gilmer Court did not directly address the issue of
whether the FAA prohibited arbitration under a mandatory arbitration
clause contained in a contract of employment. 69
Decisions subsequent to Gilmer still do not provide clear guidance in
interpreting the exclusions contained in section 1 of the FAA. 70 However,
this paper proceeds on the assumption that the FAA's exclusion does not
apply to the vast majority of employment contracts, and therefore would
allow the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in them. Regardless of
whether or not arbitration clauses in employment contracts are enforceable,
many employees may still be affected by mandatory arbitration clauses
contained in third-party contracts. Indeed, employees may be affected in
much the same way Gilmer was.
When an inventory of the reaction to this case is taken, it is clear that
the impact of Gilmer has already been felt. Several post-Gilmer federal
court cases have extended Gilmer to other federal civil rights statutes. For
example, in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds,7 1 a pre-Gilmer case, the Fifth
Circuit held that Title VII claims are not arbitrable under the FAA. That
decision was vacated by the Supreme Court in light of Gilmer, and on
remand the Fifth Circuit held that Title VII claims can be subjected to
compulsory arbitration.72 In Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,73 the
Sixth Circuit reached the same result. It should be kept in mind, however,
that these cases have arisen in the context of security registration
applications, not in purely private employment agreements.
67 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (Supp. 1992).
68 9 U.S.C. § 1.
69 Gilmer, 500 U.S.at 25 n.2.
70 See generally Willis v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991);
Dancu v. Coopers & Lybrand, 57 FEP 689 (E.D. Pa. 1991); and Spellman v. Securities,
Annuities, and Insurance Services, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (Cal. 1992).
71 905 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1990).
72 Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229, 230 (5th Cir. 1991).
73 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
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In addition, although the Supreme Court did not directly address the
issue, it appears that most commentators in the employment field have
considered the ramifications that exist if arbitration provisions in individual
employment contracts are indeed enforceable. Numerous law review articles
have been written on several aspects of the subject, the business community
has thoroughly researched and explored the potential for establishing
arbitration systems for the administrative resolution of statutory claims, 74
and a number of professional groups greatly concerned with the issue have
created agendas to address specific questions that arise regarding the
practical aspects of arbitrating in a non-union setting. The work of two such
recently-developed groups is particularly notable.
First, at its convention in New Orleans in August of 1994, the Labor
Arbitration and Law of Collective Bargaining Committee of the American
Bar Association's Labor Law Section established a special task force to
explore the development of a mutually acceptable procedure for resolving
the whole range of workplace and related disputes, and specifically, to
resolve issues relating to the increasing frequency of arbitration of statutory
issues in a non-union setting. 75 The Task Force is comprised of
representatives from the Labor Law Section of the ABA, the National
Academy of Arbitrators, the American Arbitration Association, the Federal
74 See Joseph F. Vella, on behalf of the Labor Policy Association, Testimony at the final
public hearing before the Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the
U.S. Department of Labor). More data needs to be collected before any hard conclusions can
be drawn as to the extent employers have adopted mandatory arbitration for employment
disputes. Indeed, on March 4, 1994, the House Education and Labor Committee requested the
General Accounting Office (GAO) to initiate a comprehensive study of non-collectively
bargained corporate personnel policies that compel arbitration of federal EEOC claims. See
also Professor Samuel Estreicher, Testimony at the final public hearing before the Dunlop
Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
Professor Estreicher asserts that the trend among companies today is to allow a third-party
arbitrator to have the final say, at least in the company's in-house grievance procedures.
75 Labor Arbitration Panel Recommends Task Force on Nonunion Arbitration, 1994
DLR 151 d18, (The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.), August 9, 1994. The creation of the
task force was inspired by the presence of Arnold Zack, President of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, who presented his personal views at the August 8th meeting. He stated that the
members of the National Academy of Arbitrators are comfortable in interpreting the four
comers of a collective bargaining agreement but do not necessarily have the training and
experience to substitute for the legal process in interpreting statutes. Zack also noted that only
ten percent of the National Academy of Arbitrators' arbitrators are women and said that the
profession needs more women and minority arbitrators. Finally, he said that he would like to
see the National Academy of Arbitrators develop mutually acceptable due process standards
for employer-provided arbitrations in the statutory field. Id.
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Mediation and Conciliation Service, and the Society of Professionals in
Dispute Resolution.
Second, the Commission on the Future of Worker-Management
Relations (Dunlop Commission) is also undertaking the task of addressing
similar issues. 76 The ten-member Commission, chaired by former Secretary
of Labor John T. Dunlop, has as part of its overall mission, ventured into
determining ways that workplace disputes can be directly resolved by the
parties rather than through recourse to the courts. 77 In its interim fact-
finding report issued in early June of this year, the Commission said that
"private arbitration has served as an effective and flexible process for
resolving workplace issues covered by collective bargaining agreements." 78
In so concluding, the panel report also pointed out the possibility for the
wider use of arbitration in the non-union setting. The testimony given
before the Dunlop Commission regarding alternative forms of dispute
resolution in the workplace79 is of particular relevance to Section IV of this
Note and will be referred to throughout.
It should be emphasized that the Dunlop Commission did not restrict
itself to the assumption that arbitration provisions in private employment
contracts are enforceable. Rather, it addressed a whole host of issues,
including the question of whether arbitration and other forms of dispute
resolution should even be permitted in the non-union employment context.
The third question put before the Commission and the responses it elicited
are the main aspect of the Dunlop Commission material that will be used.
The issue was stated as follows: What (if anything) should be done to
increase the extent to which workplace problems are directly resolved by the
parties themselves, rather than through recourse to state and federal courts
and government regulatory bodies?
C. Concerns That Have Arisen Because of Gilmer
Given the widespread reaction and response to the Gilmer decision, it is
clear that Gilmer presents many unresolved questions with respect to the use
of arbitration to resolve employment claims based on statutory rights. As
Gilmer himself recognized, there are several concerns regarding the
adequacy of arbitration procedures in dealing with such disputes.80 Such
76 Dunlop Panel Hears Alternative for Resolving Workplace Disputes, 1994 DLR 188
d31 (October 5, 1994).
77id.
78 Id.
79 Id. A six-hour hearing, which was held on September 29, 1994, was the final public
testimony given before the Dunlop Commission. Id.
80 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 30 (1991).
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concerns include the possibility of biased arbitrators, limited discovery,
undue secrecy in decision-making, and inadequate relief-all of which were
identified in detail above. 81 Other concerns regarding the procedures used in
arbitration include its less restrictive evidentiary standards, its informal
nature, and its tendency to preclude employees' traditional access to the due
process and fairness of judicial appeal.8 2
In addition to the procedural concerns cited in the above paragraph,
many other concerns have been raised. First, it is asserted that the rules of
an arbitration system should be responsible for governing the practical
aspects involved in arbitrating, such as locating and selecting a suitable,
neutral arbitrator and deciding who pays him or her for the services
provided. Second, many questions are posed regarding the creation of
arbitration programs: who should create the program, under what rules and
procedures the arbitration should proceed, and whether certain minimum
requirements should be included in the agreement in order to provide due
process. Third, because the inclusion of arbitration provisions in
employment contracts may actually increase the number of employment
disputes being brought for resolution-because of the purported easy access
to the system-arrangements must be made to ensure that there are enough
qualified arbitrators to address the increased load. 83 Fourth, questions exist
as to the finality of an arbitrator's decision and when, if ever, it may be
appealed. Fifth, whether or not an arbitrator is limited in his power to
award damages, the perception is that the tendency may be to exercise more
restraint than juries in giving awards. 84 Finally, the purported existence of
unequal bargaining power between employers and employees is brought up
as a reason to be hesitant to enforce arbitration agreements. 85 Although a
host of other issues exist, only those cited in the preceding two paragraphs
will be addressed and analyzed in detail in Section IV of this Note.
81 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31-32. See supra textual discussion at pp. 156-58 for a detailed
description of these issues.
82 Zaok, supra note 1..
83 John M. Husband & Brian M. Munaugh, Arbitration of Employment Disputes After
Gilmer, 20 CoLO. LAW 2277, 2289 (1991).
8 4 id.
85 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33.
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IHI. How ARBITRATION WORKS
A. The Basic Idea Behind Arbitration
Anglo-American jurisprudence has long favored methods that accelerate
the resolution of disputes, preferably by means short of actual litigation.86
Thus, the resolution of disputes through methods of alternative dispute
resolution rather than through litigation is favored.87 Because it has
received a new impetus in recent years as an alternative means of resolving
disputes, one of the most frequently used methods has been arbitration.88
Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution in which one or
more disinterested persons, known as arbitrators, investigate and determine
a resolution to a disputed matter which has been submitted to them for
adjudication by the parties involved in the controversy.89 All parties to an
action must expressly agree that their dispute will be subject to an
arbitration hearing in lieu of a judicial proceeding, as the decisions of
arbitrators, termed "awards, " 9° are for the most part binding upon the
parties. 91 Arbitration may, in fact, be preferred to a judicial proceeding
because it allows the parties to achieve a final resolution of their differences
in a less expensive, more expeditious, and less formal manner than is
normally available in ordinary court proceedings. 92
Generally, unless the parties provide otherwise, prehearing discovery is
not available in conventional labor arbitration. 93 In addition, the rules of
evidence typically do not apply. Because arbitration is typically less formal
than litigation, some arbitrators are apt to receive into evidence almost
anything for what it is worth. Finally, arbitrators are generally empowered
with the same remedial power as judges. This includes, for example, the
authority to award backpay, reinstatement, front pay and other "make
whole" remedies, and compensatory damages.
Arbitrators may or may not have had formal instruction in the law.94
They are generally not required to write opinions or otherwise give the
reasoning behind their decisions, and there is no requirement that a
86 4 AM. JUR. 2d Alternative Dispute Resolution § 7 (1995).
87 id.
88 5 AM. JUR. 2dArbitration and Award §§ 1-189 (1962).
89 Id. at § 1 (1962).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Stephen P. Younger, Structuring ADR Proceedings, N.Y.LJ., Sept. 20, 1993, at 1.
94 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 2 (1962).
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complete record of the arbitrated proceedings be maintained. 95 "The
arbitrator need not follow the law, may disregard the evidence and
published legal or arbitration decision precedents, and may decide the case
according to his own concept of fairness, justice, or equity."96 Moreover,
the judicial appealability of an arbitration award is very limited and such an
award will be set aside only when there exists a clear case of illegality,
fraud, misconduct, gross mistake, or error.9
7
The majority of these characteristics clearly reflect the general goal of
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), which is not only to "arrive at a
decision about who is right and who is wrong," 98 as in litigation, but also
to "produce a more durable solution by restoring, preserving, or enhancing
the parties' relationship. "99 As previously mentioned, such a goal is of
particular importance in union setting disputes where the disputants may
have to work together in the future. 100
95 5 AM. JUR. 2d Arbitration and Award § 2 (1962).
96 Joseph Brandschain, Preparation and Trial of a Labor Arbitration Case, 18 PRAC.
LAW. 17, 24 (1972).
97 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 149-50 (1975).
98 Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation - A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16
PEPP. L. REV. S5, S6 (Supp. 1989).
99 Kathleen A. Devine, Note, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Policies, Participation and
Proposals, II REv. LITIG. 83, 89 (1991).
100 See Deborah A. Schmedemann, Reconciling Differences: The Theory and Law of
Mediating Labor Grievances, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 523, 526-30 (1987); Thomas A. Lambros,
The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution: A Report to the
Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on the Operation of the Jury System, 103
F.R.D. 461, 471 (1984). Arbitration differs from other forms of ADR such as mediation,
negotiation, and summary jury trials in that, unlike the latter methods, arbitration is an
adjudicatory process and the decisions of an arbitrator bind the parties. Mediation and
negotiation are similar to arbitration in that they are informal processes where each party is
given the opportunity to present its case. But, unlike arbitration, mediation and negotiation are
used solely to open the lines of communication between the disputants via a neutral third party
whose conclusions have no legal effect. In summary jury trials, the trial experience is
simulated; evidence is given in the form of statements by attorneys to a six-member jury.
Unlike arbitration, though, live testimony is forbidden. In addition, in a summary jury trial,
jurors are not told that their verdict is non-binding on the parties, who will simply use the
damage award as a guide for settling the case. Thus, the greatest difference between
arbitration and most other methods of ADR is that the decision of the arbitrator is legally
conclusive, unlike other forms of ADR, in which the triers of facts are generally not
empowered to decide disputes, but only to facilitate settlement.
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B. Arbitration in the Traditional Union-Management Context
Employers and unions who are in a collective bargaining relationship
typically have negotiated a well-defined procedure for resolving disputes
which arise under their labor agreement. The process for dealing with
grievances 0 1 is itself a term and condition of employment under the
National Labor Relations Act, 102 and therefore, the parties are obligated to
bargain in good faith to establish its components. 10 3 Such bargaining has
tended to produce a pattern for handling grievances which includes both
formal and informal elements.
The first step is normally the filing of a written grievance by either the
employee or the union identifying the alleged contract violation. There is
typically a short time limit imposed in order to eliminate stale
complaints. 104 Regardless of who files the complaint, it is the union, as
signatory to the collective bargaining agreement, which is in control of
processing grievances. 105 Employers have the right to resolve grievances
voluntarily with individual employees as long as the result is not
inconsistent with the contract, 1°6 but grievance resolution with the union is
the norm.107 The employee cannot insist that the union take any particular
action, but in turn, the union must satisfy a duty of fair representation to
employees in handling their claims. 108
In essence, the grievance procedure in a collective bargaining
agreement is itself an ADR technique, one that is much like the process of
negotiation in litigation. Similarly, as in the case of litigation, there is a
point at which the parties may find themselves unable to reach a mutually
satisfactory settlement. In the context of a lawsuit, this means that litigation
will most likely follow. In contrast, in the context of a dispute under a
collective bargaining agreement, litigation is not usually the result. Most
collective bargaining agreements contain a provision requiring the
101 FRANK ELKOU=I & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS, at 155 (4th
ed. 1985). "The term [grievance] connotes conflict and irritation, and thus could be defined as
any 'gripe' or any type of complaint by an employee or a union against the employer or by an
employer against his employee or the union." Id.
102 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
103 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). This section of the Act
creates a duty to bargain in good faith over the terms and conditions of employment.
10 4 ELXOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 101, at 165-67.
105 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
106 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1988).
107 ELxouRi & ELKOURI, supra note 101, at 165-66.
108 See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
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arbitration of unsettled grievances in lieu of litigation.109 In this process, a
third-party neutral is selected through agreed-upon procedures. 110 The
neutral conducts a hearing at which all relevant evidence and arguments are
received, and ultimately issues an award resolving the dispute. The award,
moreover, is for all practical purposes final and binding, with very limited
opportunities for review available. 111
The process of grievance arbitration has become firmly embedded in the
unionized sector of the employment population. 112 There appears to be a
strong consensus that it is a far less expensive and much more expeditious
process for dispute resolution than traditional litigation.113 The proceedings
are much less formal than a trial, and many employers and unions have
agreed to further cost-saving tactics, such as dispensing with transcripts,
and relying upon union business agents and personnel officers to present
simple cases rather than employing the services of attorneys. If frequency of
use is a relevant measure, one would have to conclude that the system is
successful. 114
As can be discerned from the above, arbitration under collective
bargaining agreements is a unique form of alternative dispute resolution.
Although labor arbitration procedures are similar to procedures used in
other arbitral forums, the role of arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement is different from its role in a non-union setting. 115 The collective
bargaining agreement is more than a contract; it is a generalized code that
governs the entire employment relationship. 116 Arbitration is a means of
solving the unforeseeable by molding a private sort of law that effectively
shapes the common law of a particular industry or a particular plant. 117
109 ELKOURI & ELKouu, supra note 101, at 6. A study made by the Bureau of Labor
Statistics of agreements in effect on or after July 1976 indicate that almost 96 per cent of
collective bargaining agreements in the nation's most important industries provided for
arbitration as the terminal point of the grievance machinery. ELKOURI & ELKOURI , supra
note 101, at 6.
1 10 Id. at 135-37.
... Id. at 41.
112 1d.
113 Clyde Summers, Effective Remedies for Employment Rights: Preliminary Guidelines
and Proposals, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 457, 475 (1992).
114 ELKOURi & ELKOURI , supra note 101, at 6.
115 G. Richard Shell, ERISA and Other Federal Employment Statutes: When Is
Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Substitute"for the Courts, 68 TEx. L. REv. 509, 519
(1990).
116 United Steelworkers v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578-79
(1960).
117 Id. at 579.
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The arbitrator plays a special role, as his power is generally limited to
interpreting the collective bargaining agreement.118 The Supreme Court has
held that although arbitrators can look outside the contract for guidance,
their role is limited to interpretation and application of the collective
bargaining agreement. 119 An arbitrator does not generally have jurisdiction
to apply public law. For this reason, as well as others, 120 courts are
unwilling to defer to a labor arbitrator's decision when statutory rights are
involved, and thus exercise de novo review of statutory claims. Under this
model, arbitrators do not have the authority to resolve specific statutory
rights that may conflict with the bargain between the parties. 121
In discrimination cases, courts are especially concerned about
protecting individual rights. In arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement, however, the interests of individual employees are often
subordinated to the collective interests of all the members of the bargaining
unit. 122 When an employee's statutory rights are at' stake, the tension
between collective interests and an individual's interests may be detrimental
to the employee asserting those rights. 123  Thus, the union may not
vigorously assert an employee's statutorily granted right if an alternative
expenditure of resources would result in increased benefits for workers in
the bargaining unit as a whole.124 The unique function of arbitration in
collective bargaining agreements has led the Supreme Court to limit the
scope of labor arbitration in that particular arena.
118 ELKouRI & ELKOuRRI, supra note 101, at 29-30.
119 Id.
120 Other reasons include the expertise that courts have regarding statutory issues and
the fear that statutory claims may not be fully litigated by the union.
121 See generally ELKOuRI & ELKOURI, supra note 101; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 60 (1974). This situation arises when the collective bargaining agreement
and the law conflict. From an arbitrator's perspective, there are two possible points of view.
On one hand, the arbitrator can deny the grievance, thereby giving respect to the law and
ignoring the collective bargaining agreement. On the other hand, the arbitrator can grant the
grievance and, in turn, respect the collective bargaining agreement and ignore the law.
Arbitrators appear to be split in how to address this situation. See also Mittenthal, The Role of
Law in Arbitradon, Proceedings of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting 42 (1968) for a thorough
discussion.
122 Shell, supra note 115, at 519.
123 Barrentine v. Arkansas Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981).
124 Id. at 750.
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C. Advantages and Disadvantages of Arbitration in the Union
Setting
Proponents of arbitration maintain that the benefits which it affords
cause it to be an attractive alternative to litigation.125 One of arbitration's
key advantages is expediency: whereas a claim may take years to be
resolved in the courts, arbitrators typically adjudicate claims within a matter
of months. 126 Another advantage to arbitration is that it is generally less
expensive than litigation. Legal counsel is not required, and often is not
used. Further, if a party elects to retain such counsel, arbitration's
expediency and limited discovery keep costs to a minimum. 127
In addition, arbitration is much more satisfactory than litigation when a
"decision by men with a practical knowledge of the subject is desired" 128
and when it is necessary that the parties' relationship must endure. This, of
course, is directly applicable when it comes to resolving disputes in the
collective bargaining context. The Supreme Court itself has stated that
arbitration is superior to litigation in this context:
The labor arbitrator performs functions which are not normal to the
courts; the considerations which help him fashion judgments may indeed
be foreign to the competence of the courts.... The parties expect that his
judgment of a particular grievance will reflect not only what the contract
says but, insofar as the collective bargaining agreement permits, such
factors as the effect upon productivity of a particular result, its
consequence to the morale of the shop, his judgment whether tensions will
be heightened or diminished. For the parties' objective in using the
arbitration process is primarily to further their common goal of
uninterrupted production under the agreement, to make the agreement
serve their specialized needs. The ablest judge cannot be expected to
bring the same experience and competence to bear upon the determination
of a grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed. 129
125 W. John Moore, Business Sees Victory in Court Ruling, NAT'L L.J., July 13, 1991,
at 1751.
126 AM. JUR. NEw ToPic SERVICE, Alternative Dispute Resolution §7 (1985).
127 Roger L. Anderson & James W. Robinson, Is Arbitration the Answer in Wrongful
Termination Cases? 42 LAB. L.J. 121, 121 (1991).
128 ELKouRI & ELKouRi, supra note 101, at 7 (quoting Webster v. Van Allen, 216
N.Y.S. 552, 554 (N.Y. App. Div. 1926)).
129 Id. at 7-8 (quoting United Steelworkers v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574, 581-82 (1960)).
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Going hand in hand with this, arbitration is also an attractive option
when there are difficult technical issues involved. This is so because the
parties can choose an arbitrator who has expertise in that particular area.
130
Specifically, the parties have the ability to contact a dispute resolution
organization that specifically deals with arbitrators, and have it send both
parties a list of proposed arbitrators, with background material on each.
13 1
This is particularly advantageous as it reduces the need for expert
testimony. 132
Another advantage is that because the parties in a union setting arbitrate
voluntarily, compliance with an award is achieved in most instances. Only
infrequently is court action required for the enforcement or vacation of
awards.13 3  In addition, because the decision of the arbitrator is for the
most part final and binding, the uncertainty of the appeals process is
typically avoided. 134
Arbitration is private and confidential. Many parties do not want the
subject matter of their complaints spread all over the court records. Thus, if
arbitration is resorted to, the proceedings are typically entirely private, and
so is the arbitrator's decision. 135 Arbitrators also pay less attention to the
rules of evidence. This is considered by some commentators to be an
advantage of arbitration as it makes it possible to get to the heart of the
matter quickly. 136
Although some commentators point to the lack of discovery
opportunities provided for in arbitration, others see it as a distinct
advantage. This becomes clear, they assert, when the cost of court discovery
is examined. If a party were to go through normal court discovery,
depending upon the case, the expense for it could end up being close to the
maximum amount of money that can be recovered. 137 In addition, the fact
130 Stephen B. Goldberg et al., Litigation, Arbitration, or Mediation: A Dialogue, 75-
JUNE A.B.A. J. 70, 71 (1989).
131 id.
132 Michael W. Hawkins, Alternative Dispute Resolution: An Alternative for Resolving
Employment Litigation and Disputes, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 493, 495 (1993).
133 See generally ELKOuRI & ELKOURI, supra note 101, 23-95 (Supp. 1985-89).
134 Hawkins, supra note 132.
135 Id.
136 Goldberg, supra note 130, at 72.
1 37 Id. Normal court discovery consists of an average of 4-5 depositions, plus five days
in which to try the case. This can cost as much as $50,000. If the potential for recovery is
near or less than that dollar amount, it does not make sense to litigate. With the limited
discovery involved with arbitration, a claimant can expect two depositions, and the case could
be tried in two days time at a cost of $20,000. In addition, although with arbitration there
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that arbitrators are not bound to the rules of evidence acts as a
counterweight to balance out reduced discovery.13 8
Opponents of arbitration point to a number of concerns and
disadvantages. Critics focus on the lack of information in arbitration
proceedings.13 9 Unlike judicially available mechanisms for obtaining
information, complainants bringing their cases before an arbitrator typically
do not have the right to engage in extensive discovery or compel the
production of documents. 140
In addition, opponents have also criticized the secrecy involved in
arbitration as it avoids the negative aspects of public knowledge. In so
doing, it may shield unfair employers from public accountability as
arbitrated disputes are usually held in confidential forums. 141 As a result,
employers who engage in unfair employment practices may be able to
escape the adverse publicity that would otherwise hold them accountable for
their actions. 142 In relation to the above point, because arbitration decisions
do not become generally available as a result of arbitrated claims, they
cannot be used as precedent. 143 Thus, the scope of arbitration is typically
extremely narrow as arbitrated complaints are often dealt with on an
individual basis so that the outcome will only affect the individual bringing
the action. 144
Furthermore, opponents also criticize the lack of regulatory controls
over the process, the limited scope of judicial review, and arbitrators' lack
of legal experience. 145 Finally, many commentators also believe that the
"outcomes of ADR do not give proper deference to 'substantive legal
norms.'"
146
exists an administrative fee which is paid to the organization supplying the arbitrator, it is
usually less than $2,500. Goldberg, supra note 130, at 72.
138 Gilimer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp,, 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991).
139 Anderson & Robinson, supra note 127.
140 Carol-Teigue J. Thomas, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation: When is an
Employee's Right to a Judicial Forum Precluded by an Arbitration Agreement? 27 NEW ENG.
L. REV. 791, 795 (1993).
141 Gibner, 500 U.S. at 31.
142 id.
143 id.
144 Thomas, supra note 140.
145 Arthur Eliot Berkeley & E. Patrick McDermott, The Second Golden Age of
Employment Arbitration, 43 LAB. L.J. 774 (1992).
146 Richard E. Speidel, Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration
Act: The Casefor Reform, 4 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RFSOL. 157, 164 (1989).
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IV. ISSUES AND CONCERNS REGARDING THE ARBITRATION OF
STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
Whatever the outcome of the evolution whose beginning is marked by
Gilmer, it is clear that a major shift in the playing field of arbitration may
be about to take place. There exists an increasingly diverse American work
force and the trend favors enhanced statutory protection of individual
employment rights. At the same time, state and federal courts are severely
overloaded and the potential for increased numbers of employment
discrimination and wrongful discharge actions that are likely to result will
leave the Supreme Court in search of viable alternative dispute resolution
options.
Assuming that arbitration received the stamp of approval in Gilmer, a
new arbitral forum will have to be created for the adjudication of statutory-
based claims of discriminatory treatment and wrongful termination. It is in
the mutual interest of both the employee and the employer to resolve any
such disputes through a procedure that is fair, private, expeditious,
economical, final, and most importantly, less burdensome than litigation.
This section will attempt to offer suggestions for the creation of such a
procedure.
A. Creating a Program
In order to implement an arbitration system, a program or agreement
must be designed in order to provide direction and specific guidelines under
which the parties will be governed. The first issue that arises regarding this
topic is whether employees should be permitted to participate in the creation
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements or whether employers may create them
unilaterally. In the union setting, employers and union have typically
negotiated a well-defined procedure for resolving disputes which may arise
under the collective bargaining agreement. Although the employee does not
usually have the opportunity to participate in the negotiations in an
individual capacity, an advantage still exists because he or she does have a
voice through the union. Currently, there are two different viewpoints on
who should have input in determining the terms of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in a non-union setting.
One view is that employees should not be involved in the process and
several reasons are forwarded in supporting this notion. First, it is argued
that the difficulty involved in reaching a consensus in the design of an
arbitration program can not be overlooked. 147 Adoption generally comes
only after a great deal of internal debate within the company about what
147 See Vella, supra note 74.
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type of system can be used. 148 Therefore, because most employees know
nothing about or have had no experience with alternative dispute resolution,
the difficulty of choosing among the many different options would be
multiplied greatly if employee involvement were mandated.
149
Furthermore, while employee involvement potentially could be helpful, the
issues are alleged to be so complex that expertise in the substantive area
would be more valuable in terms of input. 150
Second, it is asserted that with no union it would be too difficult to
decide which employees the employer should deal with. 151 In addition,
even if a fair system was set up for choosing which employees could
participate, the idea is not practical for the following reason. Today's
workforce is more transient than in the past and workers can expect to have
as many as seven different jobs in their worklife. 152 Thus, the attachment
of a worker to a single employer is much less of a factor. 153 "It therefore
makes less sense to design a program which requires the formal input of a
group of employees who may only represent a snapshot of the workforce
continuum and who may be with another employer when the program isimplemented. "154
Third, there is a concern under section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor
Relations Act as to whether an employer is permitted to negotiate about
wages, hours, and working conditions with its non-unionized employees. 155
While a case can be made that employee involvement in designing an
arbitration program does not violate section 8(a)(2), the uncertainty over the
issue is a disincentive for many employers to involve employees in the
process. 156
The basic idea behind this view is that as long as the program created is
a fair one, it should be used to resolve statutory claims despite the fact that
employees were not allowed to have input in designing the program.
Advocates of this view allege that if employee involvement were mandatory
for an arbitration program to be upheld, then many employers would opt
out of alternative dispute resolution altogether. 157
148 See Vella, supra note 74.
149 id.
150 Lawrence Z. Lorber, on behalf of the National Association of Manufacturers,
Testimony at the final public hearing before the Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994)
(transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
151 Vella, supra note 74.
152 Lorber, supra note 150.
153 Id.
154 id.
155 Vella, supra note 74..
156 id.
157 Id.
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The other view, obviously, is that employees should be allowed to
contribute in designing a program. The reasons supporting that position are
as follows. First, it is argued that an employer's unilateral establishment of
an arbitration program raises issues of equity; 158 the prospect of allowing
employers to force employees into arbitration procedures-no matter how
fair they are-is inherently coercive in a non-union setting. 159 This inherent
power imbalance between the employer and the employee is said to be a
fatal flaw when it comes to constructing a workable, private, non-union
arbitration program that is fair. 160 In addition, it is pointed out that in the
tradition of the adversaries in the labor-management union setting, the
parties have developed their own structure of arbitration. It is suggested that
a similar system might likewise be shaped by the parties in this new
employment law setting.
Of the two views, the first appears to have more strength. As discussed
previously, allowing employees to contribute may complicate the process
rather.than simplify it. In addition, if mandated employee participation
forces employers to opt out of arbitration programs altogether, then
everyone loses. Employers should therefore be permitted to decide whether
they want employee participation in the creation of the program or not. As
indicated, one problem that could arise is getting around section 8(a)(2) of
the National Labor Relations Act. Because the concerns raised appear to be
valid ones, it is not totally clear how an employer who wants employee
participation could circumvent this. 161 Finally, although the voice that
enployees were provided with in the union setting is lost, there are other
ways to assure that their interests are being protected and that their needs
are being met. How this can be accomplished and how the inherent power
imbalance between employer and employee can be equalled out will be
discussed in detail in the remainder of Part A.
The second issue that arises regarding this topic is whether there should
be a set minimum for standards and provisions under these agreements or
whether flexibility should be maintained in order to accommodate the
differences in approach which may be taken by different organizations. In
the union setting, there are no set minimums for what must be included in a
collective bargaining agreement regarding how grievances should be
handled. Rather, the employer and the union are at an advantage in that they
158 Zack, supra note 1.
159 Coalition of Labor Union Women, Testimony at the final public hearing before the
Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
160 American Nurses Association et al., Testimony at the final public hearing before the
Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
161 Zack, supra note 1. Mr. Zack suggests that an amendment providing an exemption
from section 8(a)(2) could be the answer.
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may freely bargain to establish its components. As above, two different
viewpoints exist regarding this issue.
One view is that flexibility should be retained in order to address
legitimate differences in approach that may be taken by different employers.
It is asserted that this is necessary because of the difficulty involved in
reaching a consensus in the design of an arbitration program amongst
employers. 162  Although some incorrectly think that there is a mass
movement in the employer community toward some fairly uniform
alternative dispute resolution systems, the different views within employer
groups indicate that such a conclusion is greatly overstated. 163 Rather, the
types of programs that have been adopted vary greatly from employer to
employer. 164 Consequently, if a "one-size-fits-all" approach is taken,
adoption of an arbitration program may never happen. Finally, it is argued
that in terms of regulation, we should be mindful that it comes at a price. It
could end up detracting from the traditional advantages of arbitration and
possibly discouraging its utilization.
The other viewpoint on this issue is that guidelines should be
established in order to ensure that an arbitration system is fair. Such
regulation can be established by an agency that has expertise in alternative
dispute resolution or by legislation. 165 The idea behind this view is that
once the minimum due process guidelines have been met, an employer
should then be given sufficient leeway to design a program that best meets
the needs of the particular employment situation. 166
In addition, if an employer's program complies with the minimum
requirements, and thereby presumably provides adequate protection for
employees, it would be deemed valid and would have the endorsement of
the governing agency. 167 Any resolution of a claim that does not include
these appropriate safeguards, however, should be deemed unenforceable
under the agreement. 168 Penalty provisions for successful challenges to
programs that do not meet the minimum requirements would mean
employers would risk appeals which might overturn their procedures and
result in de novo litigation of the claim with potentially costly jury
awards. 169
162 Vella, supra note 74.
163 Id.
164 id.
165 id.
166 id.
167 Zack, supra note 1.
168 Women's Legal Defense Fund, Testimony at the final public hearing before the
Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
169 Zack, supra note 1.
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Finally, advocates of this view, while pushing for regulation, assert
that only the safeguards that are truly necessary should be implemented.
Like everyone else involved in the debate, they are forthright in recognizing
that regulation comes at a price because it has the potential to detract from
arbitration's traditional advantages such as its informality. 170
It is my suggestion that regulation in this area should be facilitative.
"The goal of the law should be to make it possible for the parties to craft
mandatory arbitration agreements that can provide a binding,
comprehensive resolution of employment claims, under certain
safeguards." 171 Insistence on rigid formats, however, should be avoided.
Employers differ in their internal personnel practices, employee and
managerial capability, and work culture. Therefore, once the minimum
requirements have been fulfilled in order to ensure that an arbitration system
is fair, an employer should be allowed sufficient leeway to design a system
that best meets the needs of his or her particular environment. Although
there are no set minimums for procedures in the union setting, they are not
really necessary; employees' interests are adequately protected by their
representative. In a non-union setting, because mandatory employee
participation is not required, compliance with minimum requirements serves
as a substitute for input and representation.
B. Choosing an Arbitrator
One of the greatest concerns to those worried about the spill-over
impact of employer-created systems is maintaining the credibility of truly
impartial arbitration by providing access to qualified, unbiased arbitrators.
That cannot be achieved if the employer alone is entitled to designate its
choice of who is to be the arbitrator. Nor can it be achieved by allocating all
cases to the present cadre of union arbitrators. Numerous problems must be
addressed in assuring the neutrality, professional competence, and
acceptability of the arbitrators in such plans. 'In the union setting, the
arbitrator is selected through agreed-upon procedures. Because these
procedures are a product of bargaining, both the employer and the employee
representative have a say in how arbitrators are chosen. Thus, both parties
retain the advantage of being able to control that aspect of the process.
170 Professor Samuel Estreicher, Testimony at the final public hearing before the
Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
171 Id.
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1. Arbitrator Pool
One view on this subject is that the current pool of arbitrators should be
used. First, it is suggested that individual neutral designating agencies
might opt to create their own neutrals for selection in such disputes. 172
Alternatively, to assure the broadest pool of experienced professional
arbitrators, it is proposed that all of the participating designating agencies
combine their rosters into a single pool. 173 This would embrace all those
who are currently engaged in the practice of employment and labor-
management arbitration, and those who have sufficient acceptability to be
admitted to such rosters. Presumably, many of the professional arbitrators
are currently on more than one such roster. Such a pool would probably
number upward of 5,000 names nationally, although admittedly, most of
those arbitrators would be ones that have worked as labor-management
neutrals. 174
Second, advocates of this view recommend that the pool not be
restricted to lawyers. 175  It is true that the burdens imposed on the
arbitrators will require application of, and conformity to, statutes and
regulations; and that endorsement of arbitral decisions will be dependent on
compliance to legal standards. However, some of the most renowned
arbitrators, with the sharpest legal minds, are not members of the bar.176
To lose access to experienced non-lawyer arbitrators with extensive
employment law experience would be unfortunate. Finally, supporters of
this view are forthright in recognizing that if current arbitrators are used in
the non-union setting, an update in training and qualifications may be
necessary. 177 The self-interest of arbitration organizations can be counted
on to encourage this by keeping active on their rosters only those members
found to be acceptable to both employers and employees. 178
The other view is that new arbitrators are necessary to address
employment disputes in the non-union setting. Supporters of this view assert
that the current labor-management arbitrators may not be the arbitrators of
choice for the new procedures. 179 Arbitrators are viewed by many to be
ignorant of the law and too wedded to the collective bargaining standard of
"just cause" to be acceptable for statutory enforcement issues.
172 Zack, supra note 1.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 id.
176 Id.
177 Zack, supra note 1..
178 Estreicher,supra note 170.
179 Zack, supra note 1.
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Notwithstanding the above, many of the current arbitrators "lack both the
interest and commitment to venture into the new field of statutory
responsibility, and are content to stick with the labor-management [field]
without risking the agency or court reversals that might come with"
arbitrating in this new area.180
Advocates of this view also express concern about the composition of
the current pool. A recent finding by the General Accounting Office stated
that 89 percent of the arbitrators used in the securities industry in 1992 were
white men with little experience in labor law. 181 This finding implies that
current arbitrator pools lack sufficient female and minority arbitrators to
meet the expected qualifications for resolving the anticipated volume of sex,
race, and ethnic discrimination issues.
Finally, "the needs [of the] new players, as [was] true of the needs for
the original labor-management parties, may lead them to develop a wholly
different roster of acceptable arbitrators."182 Indeed, if statutory arbitration
is adopted on a wide scale, it could lead to an entirely new generation of
neutrals quite different from what the public currently perceives as being
society's labor arbitrators.
It appears that the best approach to maintaining a credible arbitrator
pool is to take a portion of each of the views asserted and combine them for
optimal results. As stated above, many of the current arbitrators have
extensive experience in employment law. To not utilize them simply
because they are a part of the old labor-management regime is impractical.
In addition, because it is in the best interest of the arbitration associations to
keep only acceptable arbitrators on their rosters, the fear of receiving an
arbitrator who is not capable of arbitrating statutory employment disputes is
minimized. However, because of the indication that many of the current
arbitrators lack desire to be a part of the new system, the search for new
arbitrators who have an interest in statutory arbitration should continue.
This is especially true in light of the lack of female and minority
representation. By utilizing such a compromise, the parties involved are
assured of having the strongest possible roster from which to choose.
2. Training and Qualification
There are no conflicting viewpoints on this subject. All interested
parties agree that some sort of training and qualification system is necessary
in order to assure the disputants that this new system of arbitration has
integrity. Because the effectiveness of this new arbitral forum is dependent
180 Zack, supra note 1.
181 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
182 Zack, supra note 1.
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on providing qualified and acceptable arbitrators, maintaining the credibility
of such a private alternative to statutory entitlement requires that arbitrators
be knowledgeable of the governing regulations, statutes, and court
decisions. 183 Most current arbitrators do not have the requisite familiarity
with the above to provide a viable alternative to litigation. 184 Therefore,
providing the aforementioned information should be an integral part of their
training.
To provide the specialized knowledge required of such neutrals, it has
been proposed that a comprehensive training program be created to
familiarize arbitrators with the requirements of the regulations and statutes
and to introduce them to applicable precedent. Once this training is
completed, the arbitration associations will be able to establish rosters of
individuals with skills pertinent to the particular issue being arbitrated. 185
Training could be provided by the government agency that will oversee
statutory arbitration or it could be provided by the arbitration associations
themselves utilizing as trainers those who have experience with the
substantive issues of employment law and the procedural process of
arbitration. 186 The designated government agency in conjunction with the
arbitration associations could jointly develop standards for such training,
and permit arbitrators who have completed such training to list those
courses on their resumes and panel cards in order to demonstrate the extent
of their expertise to potential employers.18
7
As previously mentioned, there is a lack of female and minority
arbitrators to meet the expected qualifications for resolving the anticipated
volume of sex and race discrimination issues.188 To assure the confidence
of the claimants, particular attention should be paid to augmenting the
numbers of women and minorities in the arbitration pool. Unfortunately,
the current labor-management arbitration groups are not representative of
the population at large. 189 It has been suggested that there should be
exploration of a special program whereby arbitration associations can recruit
and train such individuals in order to assure the availability of a broader
pool of acceptable arbitrators. 190 For those recruited without prior
arbitration experience, there should be additional training in the conduct of
arbitration hearings, as well as a program of mentoring by established
183 See Zack, supra note 1.
1 4 id.
185 Id.
1 86 id.
187 id.
188 Zack, supra note 1.
189 id.190 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
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arbitrators before such individuals are added to the rosters of the arbitration
associations. 19 1
It has also been asserted that if arbitrators are properly qualified and
trained, many of the fears expressed about the arbitration of statutory claims
will fall by the wayside. For example, one commentator suggests that the
"splitting of awards"-giving each of the parties something in terms of
remedy-could be reduced if the parties selected arbitrators who were
specialists in employment discrimination issues. 192 In addition, if the
neutrals who are selected to resolve these claims have the necessary
expertise, deference to their decisions will be warranted by the courts and
the agencies responsible for the laws involved. 193
Finally, at least one commentator has stated that the arbitrators of
statutory disputes should be limited to lawyers or former judges with
experience in employment law. 194 This suggestion is the only one regarding
training and qualification that I believe should be rejected. I disagree with
this assertion because of the fact that many of the best arbitrators available
have no legal training. If they are given the proper training as described
above, there is no reason why they cannot arbitrate statutory claims. To turn
away otherwise qualified men and women simply because they do not have
a law degree is unnecessary.
3. Maintaining Neutrality
The same general goals that were raised in the previous sub-topic apply
here as well: In order to assure the disputants that the new system is a
credible one, the arbitrators who will be addressing statutory disputes must
maintain neutrality. Again, all interested parties agree that this is a
necessary and vital component to a successful arbitration system. The main
fear that arises with reference to neutrality is that arbitrators may experience
undue influence in deciding cases, particularly where their livelihood
depends upon being rehired by the employer. 195 To protect against the
inherent bias of the arbitrator stemming from the "repeat user" problem 96
in the non-union setting, many recommendations have been made.
191 Zack, supra note 1.
192 Vella, supra note 74.
193 rd.
1 94 Estreicher, supra note 170.
195 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
196 The idea behind this being that arbitrators will be influenced by the fact that
employers may rehire them in the future, and thus will be biased toward them knowing that
their continued income flow is at least partially-based upon the employer's willingness to
reemploy them. Such a possibility does not exist with regard to the employee as he or she
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First, it is asserted that the employee should always have a role equal to
that of the employer in choosing the arbitrator. 197  Second, if a roster
system is used by an arbitration association, their self-interest can be
counted on to keep active only those members found to be acceptable to
both employers and employees. 198  Third, appropriate disclosure by
potential arbitrators of prior dealings with the parties or their
representatives is already a rule under the American Arbitration
Association. 199  Therefore, further regulation regarding this is not
necessary. Fourth, litigants and their representatives should be allowed to
review the previous awards of the arbitrator in order to make an intelligent
decision about the arbitrator's competence and neutrality. Finally, because
the importance of neutrality cannot be overstated, judicial review of the
outcome of an arbitration should be available to challenge a biased decision-
maker or process. 200 Specifics of when such review would be permitted
will be discussed in detail in Section H.
4. Arbitrator Selection
Because there are no true opposing viewpoints on the subject of
selecting arbitrators, as with the previous two subsections, some general
conclusions and suggestions will be outlined. The selection of the arbitrator
should be determined by the program established by the employer in
accordance with the minimum regulations imposed by the governing
agency. If the employer cannot devise selection procedures under the
agreement that are satisfactory, then the selection procedures of a
recognized neutral arbitration association should be utilized. For fairness
purposes, one of the minimum requirements must be that employee
claimants should be afforded the right to participate in the selection of the
arbitrator. This is important as arbitration appears to hold the greatest
promise of providing an acceptable alternative means of resolving
employment law claims if both parties jointly select the arbitrator. 20 1 Such
selection should be made from a panel developed by one or all of the
arbitration associations, 202 and again, it should be required that the
will, in all likelihood, be in the arbitral forum as a one-time player. American Nurses
Association et al., supra note 160.
197 id.
198 Estreicher, supra note 170.
199 Id.
200 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
201 Estreicher, supra note 170.
202 See generally supra textual discussion at 178-79.
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employer's plan provide for utilizing such a pool. 203 In addition, as
mentioned with reference to neutrality, the parties and their representatives
should be allowed to review the previous awards of the arbitrator in order to
make an intelligent decision about the arbitrator's competence and
neutrality. Finally, one advantage that is often not cited should be
mentioned. The arbitration procedures suggested allow the individual to
pick from a roster of arbitrators; by comparison, no party can select a
judge, and jury panels are selected randomly.
5. Paying the Arbitrator
The issue of who pays the arbitrator was not addressed by the Gilmer
Court. It is, however, a very important issue. Traditionally, to avoid the
appearance of partiality, collective bargaining arbitration has required that
the fee be divided equally between the employer and the union. Such an
approach in individual contracts of employment may also make sense, but
again a split in opinion exists regarding whether the cost should be borne by
both parties or by the employer alone.
Advocates of the parties splitting the fee claim that because arbitration
is much less expensive than litigation, many plaintiffs would have the
resources to share the costs, at least on a mutually agreed-upon basis.204 The
arbitration program or agreement could also provide that if the individual
employee was the prevailing party, then the employer would pay for the
costs of arbitration and other related expenses, such as transcripts. 20 5 The
claim here is that if employees were provided with a realistic comparison
between the costs of litigation and arbitration, then many more employees
would find arbitration to be the more appealing option.
The main gist of the other side of this argument is that the employer
should be required to pay all of the costs of arbitration because if an
employee is required to pay an equal share with the employer, then the cost
may be prohibitive. 2°6 Although this argument may have some validity, it
is problematic in a couple of respects. First, if an employer is required to
203 Zack, supra note 1.
204 Vella, supra note 74.
205 Id. See also Christianburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, 434 U.S. 412 (1978). In that case, the employer, the prevailing party in a Title
VII suit, sought attorney's fees against the plaintiff. The Court held that although a prevailing
plaintiff in a Title VII suit is ordinarily to be awarded attorney's fees by the court in all but
special circumstances, a prevailing defendant is to be awarded such fees only when the court
in the exercise of its discretion has found that the plaintiff's action was frivolous,
unreasonable, or without foundation.
206 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
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pay the full share or even most of the cost, the arbitrator may be biased in
favor of the deeper pockets of the employer. Second, although there are
some arbitrators who would not have a problem with the employer paying
all or most of the costs, many others decline work because they believe that
even the perception of greater employer influence, through compensation
and the potential for reemployment, reduces their effectiveness as
neutrals. 20 7 Because of the aforementioned deficiencies with the argument
for employers paying all of the costs of arbitration, the first option of both
parties splitting the costs appears to be the better choice.
C. Due Process
In terms of due process, there is little debate that at least some
procedural safeguards are necessary. This is especially true when the
concerns regarding the power imbalance between the employer and the
employee are examined. 208 Therefore, as with previous sections, some
general suggestions will be given regarding the minimum protections that
should be put in place.
First, a rule should exist stating that if a program or agreement does not
meet the minimum due process requirements, which would be established
by the agency or legislation under which the program would be
monitored, 20 9 then the decision rendered under the arbitration is
unenforceable. If this were the policy, then unfair programs would not be
used because of the risk of the arbitrator's award being set aside. 210
However, if all of the minimum requirements of due process are met, then a
presumption that the result is enforceable should exist. This is important for
two reasons: (1) it gives arbitration some credibility in terms of its inherent
fairness and finality; and (2) it eliminates the procedural hurdle of appeals
except in special circumstances. 211
Second, in terms of protection solely for the benefit of employees, the
following is suggested. It is a fact that employers are permitted to learn
virtually everything about their employees, but that employees often cannot
get even the most basic information about employment practices. 212
Correcting this information imbalance would be a way to improve the level
207 Zack, supra note 1.
208 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
209 See supra text at 173-77 for a related discussion in the context of the creation of
arbitration programs.
210 Vella, supra note 74.
211 See discussion infra part IV.G.
212 American Nurses Association et al., Testimony at the final public hearing before the
Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of Labor).
[V/ol. 11:1 1996]
ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY EMPLOYMENT CLAIMS
of trust between the employer and the employee, and most importantly,
make the arbitration process fairer. 213 In addition, employees should have
the option to be represented by an attorney or any other representative in the
arbitration proceeding if they so choose.214 Furthermore, some basic due
process notions such as notice, the right to discover information about the
employer's case, and the right to have the outcome or arbitration reviewed
by the court where appropriate should be afforded to the employee. Finally,
it is important to keep in mind that while an arbitration may not provide
either plaintiffs or defendants every legal protection, neither does a court of
law.
D. Procedure
Many complaints exist regarding procedure. This section will therefore
attempt to address these complaints and offer a possible solution. Before
reaching such issues, it is important to keep in mind that just because
certain procedures exist in courts,215 it does not mean that they should
automatically be imported into arbitration. 216
First, the main concern that exists revolves around the way that the
rules of evidence are used in arbitration. In the union setting, arbitration is
generally less formal and the rules of evidence are typically not applied.
Instead, arbitrators will usually "receive into evidence almost anything for
what its worth." 217 To minimize such concerns, arbitrators could be
directed to keep a tighter rein on the conduct of the hearing and to exclude
irrelevancies and privileged matter. However, it is also not necessary to
apply the rules of evidence. If they are applied, arbitration could lose some
of its appeal because its informal nature and expediency would be
compromised. Ultimately, if employees are given both the right to present
evidence freely, and the right to rebut the evidence and arguments offered
by the other side, then the procedure is satisfactory. Second, in terms of the
burden of proof, like in the union setting, the employer should bear the
burden of proving "just cause" for any alleged improper actions that he has
taken against his employee. If the employer meets this burden, then the
213 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160. See discussion infra part IV.E
(discussing what the employee should be allowed to access).
214 id.
215 For example, being allowed to bring class actions.
216 Estreicher, supra note 170.
217 Evan J. Spelfogel, Legal and Practical Implications of ADR and Arbitration in
Employment Disputes, 11 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 247, 266 (1993) (footnote omitted) (quoting
Survey Shows Arbitrators Agree on Thought and Practice at Work, Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(BNA) Dec. 10, 1984, at 744).
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employee should have the opportunity to rebut the showing or prove that
the reason given was a mere pretext. Finally, a neutral fact-finding process
should be implemented into arbitration programs whereby the facts of the
dispute could be established without making a judgment. 218 If such a
method were used, it could be viewed as the first step in the arbitration
process, and could result in many pending disputes being resolved. 219
E. Discovery
Generally, unless the parties provide otherwise in their collective
bargaining agreement, prehearing discovery is not available in conventional
labor arbitration. Although it is not clear how much discovery should be
required when arbitrating in the non-union setting, it is clear that some
discovery should be allowed in order to ensure the fairness of the process.
At minimum, an arbitration program should allow the employee to access
relevant information, documents, and his or her personnel file. Both parties
should be given the opportunity to conduct depositions and to bring in
witnesses at the arbitration. In addition, the arbitrator should have subpoena
power. The ultimate goal with reference to discovery is to make sure that
the plaintiff can fully develop his or her case.220 It is important to keep in
mind, however, that arbitration's discovery process should not become as
onerous as it is in the courts; if it does, one of the values of arbitration-its
expediency-will be lost. 22 1
F. Damages
Unless the parties expressly provide otherwise in the collective
bargaining agreement, arbitrators are generally empowered with the same
remedial authority as judges. This would include, for example, the authority
to award back pay, reinstatement, front pay and other "make whole"
orders, and compensatory damages. It does appear, however, that courts are
split as to whether arbitrators may award punitive damages.222 For an
arbitration program or agreement to be given deference by a court, the
employee must be able to "vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in
218 Lorber, supra note 150.
2 19 1d.
220 Vella, supra note 74.
221 Id.
222 Compare Fahnestock Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1991) with Bonar v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 835 F.2d 1378, 1386-87 (11th Cir. 1988).
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the arbitral forum. " 223  Therefore, arbitration agreements should
specifically allow the arbitrator to award whatever relief is available under
the terms of the relevant statute or common law, including punitive damages
when appropriate.
Many commentators believe that even if arbitrators are permitted to
give the same remedies as judges and juries, there is a strong possibility that
they will not do so because of their inclination to satisfy both sides, and
because of their knowledge that their income flow is dependent upon the
parties-the employer in particular-rehiring them in the future.224 One way
to deter this would be for the governing agency to monitor awards to ensure
that non-union arbitration is producing satisfactory outcomes.225 A second
deterrence would be that if the agreement fails to allow for all awards or the
possibility of certain remedies, that should be grounds for overturning the
decision or the agreement or both. 226 Finally, as previously mentioned,
parties should be permitted to review prior awards before selecting and
retaining an arbitrator.
The final issue regarding remedies in arbitration is the allegation that
the possibility of being given huge awards is lost. This assertion is
problematic for a couple of reasons. First, the frequency of such awards
being given is greatly overemphasized. The possibility of a plaintiff being
able to afford a private lawyer is unlikely. 227 In addition, with the agencies
so overworked, a plaintiff may get only a very cursory investigation of his
or her claim after much delay.228 A well-trained arbitrator will be able to
avoid this problem by giving a plaintiff what he or she is truly entitled to,
while deterring unlawful behavior on the part of the employer.
G. Finality of an Arbitrator's Decision
For the sake of credibility, it is crucial that an arbitrator's decision be
final and binding and given the fullest weight permitted by law. In terms of
what may be reviewed and when, the ultimate decision should be made by
the monitoring agency. However, a good guide for deference to arbitral
223 Mitsubishi Motor Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637
(1985); see also Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 229 (1987);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 483-86 (1989).
224 Coalition of Labor Union Women, supra note 159.
225 Estreicher, supra note 170.
226 American Nurses Association et al., supra note 160.
227 Estreicher, supra note 170.
228 Id.
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awards is the standard enunciated in Spielberg Manufacturing CO. 2 2 9 In
Spielberg, the Board stated that it would defer to the arbitrator's award
where: (1) the proceedings have been fair and regular; (2) the parties have
agreed to be bound; and (3) the decision is not clearly repugnant to the
purposes and policies of the National Labor Relations Act. In the case of
employment disputes, the arbitrator's decision would deserve deference in
terms of the last factor, so long as it was not adverse to the purposes and
policies of the statute or common law at hand. Some examples of when this
might be appropriate follow. As previously stated, if there are cases in
which significant mistakes of fact or law have been made, review should be
allowed. In addition, it should also be permitted in cases where arbitrator
bias or misconduct exists. 230 Basically, if one of these examples exist, then
review would be appropriate because the Spielberg test would not be met.
H. Publication of Opinions
Because the arbitration process in the union setting is almost always
private, there is no requirement that a written decision be issued.23 1 This,
of course, is an advantage when the parties want to keep the matter
confidential. A disadvantage, however, is that the lack of publication acts as
a very weak influence on the behavior of employers because there is no
public accountability.23 2
For the reasons that follow, such informal records are not appropriate
in the non-union setting. First, if the arbitrator does not issue a written
decision, then no precedent for future cases will exist. 23 3 Such decisions
must therefore be available for review if arbitration is truly going to become
a credible and viable option to litigation. At minimum, arbitrators should be
required to render written decisions that include findings of fact on each
issue raised and a rationale given for why the decision was reached. 23 4 A
trade-off will be that the dispute between the parties will no longer be
confidential. Second, by requiring arbitrators to publish written opinions,
the public will receive notice of the employer's activities. This will be
beneficial in serving the following functions: the employer will be deterred
229 Spielberg Manufacturing Co. and Gruenberg, 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). Such a
suggestion was made by Arnold Zack, supra note 158.
230 Vella, supra note 74.
2 3
'See Hawkins supra note 132.
232 Coalition of Women's Labor Unions, Testimony at the final public hearing before
the Dunlop Commission (Sept. 29, 1994) (transcript available at the U.S. Department of
Labor).
233 Vella, supra note 74.
234 Estreicher, supra note 170.
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from committing unlawful acts; the employees will feel that they are getting
their proverbial "day in court;" and an explanation of exactly why the case
has been won or lost will discourage retrying it or challenging the result.
V. CONCLUSION
There is no good reason to believe that the large scale experiment of
employment arbitration in the non-union setting is complete. Measurable
change is almost certain to occur in the upcoming years. The issues
involved in this new playing field are complex and are therefore not easy
ones to resolve. Despite this, arbitrators and the legal community must be
prepared to confront these challenges and lead the process of change and
adaptation.
If this new context demands an upgrading, refinement, or rebalancing
of skills in the arbitration process itself, so be it. Such additional effort may
be necessary in order to ensure the integrity and ability of arbitrators, the
fairness of arbitration programs or agreements, the competent supervision of
the discovery process, the fairness of hearings in accordance with judicial
standards, and the ability to properly resolve and implement a broad range
of remedies. Although it is extremely important that all of the individual
issues and concerns be addressed and resolved, it may be just as important
to offer employees an alternative short of full-blown litigation.
As has been true in the past, maintenance of the highest standards of
professionalism, integrity, and competence must be the focus in the
successful evolution of the institution of arbitration. The key to the
continued vitality of arbitration will be its growth and its effective response
to change. Willingness to meet the needs of the parties will surely ensure a
promising result.
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